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SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES
FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES. By Jesse H. Choper.t Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 198. $24.95.
J. Matthew Szymanski and Stephen M. Clarkez

I.

INTRODUCfiON

In his book, Securing Religious Liberty, Jesse Choper articulates a "comprehensive thesis for adjudication of all significant
issues that arise under the Religion Clauses of the Constitution."
(p. 1) Choper gets off to a promising start. He dissects the
Supreme Court's religion cases, illuminates their conceptual incoherence, and demonstrates the need for a more principled approach. Buoyed by his "extensive reflection spanning a period of
more than thirty years," (p. 190) Choper offers four grand principles that he believes will resolve all significant issues in religious
jurisprudence. His principles are helpful in classifying and conceptualizing issues and he uses them as organizational tools for
determining which governmental actions implicate the Free Exercise Clause and which implicate the Establishment Clause.
Choper's application of his four principles is not as helpful,
however. His deductions are questionable, as they appear to lack
reasoned justifications and suggest unwarranted results. Ultimately, Choper falls victim to the daunting scope of his project,
sacrificing depth of analysis for breadth of application. It is,
therefore, not hard to understand why the book has been sharply
criticized by reviewers and largely ignored by the courts.J As
Choper himself candidly acknowledges, his thesis will likely
prove "unacceptable to every existing interest group." (p. 189)
Contrary to the suggestion of other reviewers, however, we
believe the book is worth reading: it offers fresh and provocative
ideas. One cannot read Securing Religious Liberty without engaging Choper's presuppositions, challenging his ideas, and
1. Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, University of California, Berkeley.
2. The authors are associates with the Washington, D.C. area law firm of Gammon
& Grange, P.C. Our thanks to Michael Woodruff and Scott Ward for their helpful
comments.
3. As of this writing, a Westlaw a!lcases search revealed only two citations to
Choper's book: a single cite by the dissent in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of Univ~rsi~y of Vir~inia, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2537 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) and another by the
c1rcmt court m ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1445 n.lO (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Choper
for an "interesting discussion" of Establishment Clause implications of tax-supported religious displays).
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emerging with a better understanding of the myriad problems
arising under judicial interpretation of the Religion Clauses.
In the four sections that follow, this review will (1} summarize Choper's four principles; (2) highlight the early reaction of
legal academia; (3) apply Choper's four principles to a few current topics; and (4) conclude with a critique of Choper's analysis.
II.

THE FOUR PRINCIPLES

Choper's project is to promote a uniform interpretation and
application of the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment
Clause. Because he recognizes that the existing legal standards
governing these clauses suffer from doctrinal deficiencies and inconsistencies, (p. 38) Choper wipes the slate clean and attempts
to develop a new framework for analyzing cases implicating the
Religion Clauses. He begins with the basic premise, derived
from the history and text of the First Amendment and from
"cherished contemporary values," (p. 6) that the purpose of the
Religion Clauses is to "protect religious liberty and the integrity
of individual conscience." (p. 9) Choper then articulates four
principles that he believes will protect religious liberty and limit
the influence of judges' "intuitive tendenc[ies]" and "personal
predilections" in adjudicating Religion Clause disputes. (pp. 1, 78)
A.

FREE EXERCISE PRINCIPLES

1. Deliberate disadvantage principle: "Government action
that intentionally prejudices individuals because they have or do
not have certain religious beliefs should be held to violate the
Free Exercise Clause unless the government demonstrates that
the regulation is necessary to a compelling interest." (p. 41}
This free exercise principle is the least controversial of the
four, and the one most in line with recent Supreme Court holdings. It says that if state action intentionally prejudices (i.e., discriminates against) individuals on the basis of their religious
beliefs, that action is subject to strict scrutiny and is presumptively invalid.4 Choper draws a fine line between legislative motive and legislative purpose in an attempt to distinguish oblique
religious inspiration from antagonism toward religion. Legislative purpose describes the "things a legislator hopes to accomplish by the operation of the statute," whereas legislative motive
4.
(1993).

See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
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describes "those things he hopes personally to achieve by the act
of his vote." (pp. 45-46) Choper then states that religious animus
in purpose, not motive, is subject to strict scrutiny when legislators advance "obviously implausible" purposes for challenged actions. (pp. 49-50)
2. Burdensome effect principle: "If government regulations
of conduct that are generally applicable and enacted for secular/
neutral purposes (i.e., without intent to provide an advantage to
religious interests or prejudice individuals because of their religious beliefs) conflict with action or inaction pursuant to the tenets of a particular religion, the Free Exercise Clause should be
held to require an exemption under the following circumstances:
the claimant has suffered cognizable injury; the exemption does
not violate the Establishment Clause; the exemption does not require the government to abandon its entire regulatory program;
the individual's beliefs are sincerely held; violation of those beliefs entails extratemporal consequences; an alternative burden is
imposed if one exists that does not conflict with the religious objector's beliefs; and the government cannot demonstrate that denial of the exemption is necessary to a compelling interest." (p.
54)
In his introduction, Choper contends that the primary purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to prevent the "state from
impeding the practices of religious minorities." (p. 13) (emphasis
added) Choper's burdensome effect principle, however, provides
exemptions from generally applicable laws for any religious
claimant that meets certain conventional criteria: sincerely-held
belief; cognizable burden; and subjection to a burdensome law
that is not necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. But Choper imposes additional, idiosyncratic criteria that
the claimant must also meet: the exemption cannot force the government to abandon an entire program;s an alternative burden
(if one exists) must be imposed on the claimant (e.g., SeventhDay Adventist must close shop on Saturday instead of Sunday);
the exemption cannot violate the Establishment Clause (as
Choper contends it does in Sherbert v. Verner6 because the reli5. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(rejecting free exercise claim of Native Americans that would prevent Forest Service from
harvesting timber and constructing road in area of national forest traditionally used for
their religious purposes).
6. 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state did not have a compelling interest in
denying unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist employee who was fired for
refusing to work on Saturday, and that the state could not force the employee to abandon
religious convictions in order to qualify for benefits).
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gious claimant was awarded tax money in the form of unemployment compensation); (p. 21) and, most fundamental of all to
Choper's framework, the law (if obeyed) would cause the person
to suffer extratemporal consequences in the afterlife.
Extratemporal consequences is Choper's answer to the question, "What is 'religion'?" for purposes of applying the burdensome effect principle. Choper rejects many possibilities,
including the expansive "ultimate concerns" definition which
posits that religious faith is "the state of being ultimately concerned" in any ideology, including nationalism, secularism, individualism, economic utopianism, or scientific naturalism. (pp.
69-74) He dismisses this concept of religion as being too vague
and theologically complex for courts to understand and apply
with any consistency. (pp. 71-74) Choper also rejects the "transcendental reality" definition of religion, (pp. 80-85) which includes religions that believe in the temporal significance of
human actions and temporal, divine intervention (e.g., most evangelical, Judaeo-Christian traditions). Choper believes this definition is overinclusive, as it encompasses traditionally "secular"
ideologies as well as religious ones. (pp. 84-85)
Instead, to balance the broad protection afforded by this
principle's exemptions from government regulation, Choper
draws a narrow definition of religion: belief in the "extratemporal consequences" of actions. (pp. 74-80) Claimants for
religious exemptions must have good faith and sincerely-held beliefs that the results of their actions "extend in some meaningful
way beyond their lifetimes." (p. 77) In Choper's view, the religions qualifying for this protection are those that comport with
the "conventional, average person's conception of religion" (e.g.,
belief in God, but not belief in the Republican Party).7 (p. 77)
Thus, Choper believes courts would apply the "extratemporal
consequences" definition of religion with greater consistency
than the ultimate concerns or transcendental reality definitions.
B.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PRINCIPLES

In his section, "Basic Postulates and Alternative Theories,"
(pp. 1-40) Choper bums off much of the jurisprudential dross of
the Establishment Clause with convincing candor, beginning with
7. By "conventional" forms of religion, Choper does not mean mainstream religion; for instance, he extends his definition to the practice of some Native Americans
smoking peyote. (pp. 57, 96)
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the "endorsement" test as advocated by Justice O'Connor.s He
criticizes the endorsement test on the ground that "federal judicial power should not be invoked to remedy harm no greater
than 'indignation,' 'offense,' or the 'psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees."' (pp. 31-32) He fears that the endorsement test may
be used to overturn legitimate government attempts to afford
genuine, important religious accommodations. (pp. 31-34)
Choper points out that government action that benefits or accommodates one religion would violate his deliberate disadvantage principle if such action were intended to stigmatize another
person's religious beliefs.9 (p. 50)
Choper does not advocate a strict separation of church and
state.1o He implicitly repudiates the Lemon test.n Choper analyzes both the purpose and effect of government action affecting
religion, (pp. 35, 98-99, 160) but in a less formalistic, more flexible framework than that of the Lemon test. Government actions
may have a religious purpose, as long as they do not pose a significant threat to religious liberty and are not discriminatory.
Also contrary to Lemon, the "principal effect" of such actions
may be to advance religion, as long as they do not pose a meaningful threat to religious liberty. Moreover, Choper never in-

8. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 635 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. Choper quotes William P. Marshall: "A favorable statement about one class is
not necessarily a correlative pejorative remark about another class." (p. 34) (citing Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66
Ind. L.J. 351, 365 (1991)).
10. Nor does Choper advocate a separation of religion and politics. He recognizes
that some degree of religious friction in society is inevitable. Accordingly, he does not
believe that "divisiveness" should be a criterion for applying the Establishment Clause.
"[I]f government were actually to ban religious conflict in the lawmaking process, this
would raise serious questions under the First Amendment's guarantee of political freedom as well as religious liberty." (p. 25)
11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that to survive Establishment
Clause scrutiny, government action (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) may not have a
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) may not foster an
excessive entanglement between government and religion). This test has been severely
criticized by at least five members of the current Court. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (likening
the Lemon test to a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried"). See generally Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 Case W. Reserve L. Rev. 795 (1993). Reports of
Lemon's death were premature, however, as the Court recently revived its three-pronged
test in Agostini v. Felton, 1997 WL 338583 (1997).
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vokes the cumbersome "excessive entanglement" prong of
Lemon as an evaluative criterion.tz
Choper follows his deconstruction of the Establishment
Clause with a substitute framework:
1. Intentional advantage principle: "Government programs
that deliberately favor religious interests or government actions
that relieve individuals because of their religious beliefs from the
burdens of generally applicable regulations should be held to violate the Establishment Clause only if the programs or actions
pose a significant threat to religious liberty or if they are discriminatory." (p. 97)
The intentional advantage principle is a variation of the "coercion" test that evaluates state actions based on their effects on
individual conscience. It states that government actions that intentionally favor religiontJ (e.g., provide exemptions from generally applicable laws, honor religious holidays, fund religious
organizations, etc.) violate the Establishment Clause only if they
"pose a significant threat to religious liberty." State actions pose
such a threat in one of two ways.
The first way is by coercing or significantly influencing people either to violate their religious beliefs, engage in religious activities, or adopt religious beliefs when they would not otherwise
have done so. For example, exemptions from compulsory draft
laws for religious objectors would fail the intentional advantage
principle in Choper's opinion, because they encourage the assumption of religious beliefs and practices by individuals who
would seek to qualify for the exemption. (p. 131) Similarly, religious practices in public schools that are "inherently compulsive"
(e.g., vocal prayer, Bible reading, released time for religious in12. See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict, 41 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 673, 681 (1980).
13. Choper defines "religion" more broadly for Establishment Clause purposes.
Whereas Choper believes religious exercise should be advantaged under the Free Exercise Clause, he believes it should be disadvantaged, or "disfavored" under the Establishment Clause (pp. 24, 162) (though Choper advocates more of a neutralization of religion
than a penalization). Thus, no longer does "religion" entail "extratemporal consequences." Rather, religion comprises "all religious beliefs," (p. 115) which include "narrow partisan ideologies" (p. 116) and "ultimate truth" (p. 105) worldview teachings.
Choper explains that if the Establishment Clause were only to reach ideologies concerning extratemporal consequences, it would not apply to a wide variety of activities that
violate religious liberty; for instance, the public schools could allow voluntary, intercessory prayers to God seeking help in the here-and-now (but not in the hereafter), and state
funds could be granted to a sect that does not believe in salvation or other extratemporal
consequences. (p. 103) Choper believes that his broader definition of religion for Establishment Clause purposes precludes these results.
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struction, and inclusion of "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance) violate this principle. (pp. 142-43)
The second way government action threatens religious liberty is by compelling people to furnish financial support to religion through their tax dollars. Choper considers this type of
"coercion" to be particularly egregious. For instance, he thinks
Sherbert v. Vernert4 was wrongly decided, in part, because the
Court-ordered unemployment benefits in that case amounted to
"religious coercion in the form of a tax subsidy for religious practice." (p. 121} Choper would prohibit government from employing chaplains.ts (pp. 123, 153) However, he would permit
government to place religious symbols and slogans on public
property (pp. 154-55) as long as the amount of tax funds devoted
to such placement is "de minimis." (pp. 154, 157) For instance,
public schools could post the Ten Commandments in their classrooms, (p. 147) and any local, state or federal government could
constitutionally declare, "Christianity is our religion." (pp. 15758)
Choper's application of the intentional advantage principle
to religion in the schools produces unique results. Because
"young people of minority religious groups are extremely sensitive," (p. 141} he thinks the inclusion of the words, "under God,"
in the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional. (p. 142) For similar reasons, classroom prayer, graduation prayer, and released
time religious programs also fail his intentional advantage principle. (pp. 140-45) In order for religious activity to satisfy the
principle, a school must provide sufficient alternatives to the religious activity. For instance, equal access and "dismissed time"
programs (i.e. religious activities available before or after hours)
satisfy the test because they are less "coercive" than released
time programs (i.e. religious instruction or activity available during school hours), and because "religion can compete more successfully with arithmetic than with recreation." (p. 151, note 173
(citation omitted)) Choper's theory allows for silent prayer,
teaching creation science, and excising evolution from the public
14. 374 u.s. 398 (1963).
15. However, Choper believes that a judge's practice of reciting a prayer at the beginning of each court session does not violate the Constitution under the intentional advantage principle. See Nonh Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation v.
Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991). Choper distinguishes this case from Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a state legislature's practice of opening each
session with a prayer by a publicly paid chaplain), on the grounds that Marsh involved an
expenditure of tax funds to support the chaplain, thereby violating the intentional advantage principle, whereas Constangy involved "no meaningful expenditure of tax funds."
(p. 153)
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school curriculum, because Choper believes these activities are
less coercive than released time programs or the Pledge of
Allegiance.
2. Independent impact principle: "Even if its purpose is
nonreligious and it has general applicability, government action
that benefits religious interests and has no independent secular
impact should be held to violate the Establishment Clause if the
action poses a meaningful danger to religious liberty." (p. 160)
Under the independent impact principle, a government action's secular effects cannot depend on or derive from the initial
completion of a religious aim. (p.167) For instance, Choper believes that vouchers from a state's generally-applicable program
for vocational rehabilitation should not be applied to religious
schools,16 because then the state's secular objective would be
achieved only through a religious program; the state would be
"employ[ing] religion as an engine of civil policy."11 (pp. 161,
169, 172) However, Choper believes that a state may support the
public restoration of church buildings (e.g., Catholic missions, pp.
161, 163) through similar programs of general applicability, because such restoration is not derivative from any religious activity
or effect.
Choper believes that a state can fund the secular aspects of
parochial school education without violating the independent impact principle, as long as the state aid is discounted by the
amount that religious influence reduces secular value. (pp. 17883) In other words, the state would pay a parochial school a fraction of the per capita student cost at public schools based on the
number of hours of "secular" education that the parochial school
provides. In making this calculation, courts would determine
what is purely "secular" as opposed to "religious" education, and
parochial schools would have to justify allocating costs to the
"secular side of the ledger." (p. 183) Educational voucher programs likely would be constitutional only if the subsidy to religious schools did not exceed the cost or value of the secular
educational services rendered by those schools. (pp. 186-87)
Choper also would uphold programs in which public school

16. See Witters v. Washington DepL of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
17. This phrase, which Choper uses repeatedly in this chapter, (e.g., pp. 167, 169,
172) is borrowed from James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, Sec. 5 (cited in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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teachers provide secular remedial and enrichment instruction to
parochial school students on parochial school premises.1 8 (p. 37)
PEER EVALUATIONS: LEGAL ACADEMIA'S
RESPONSE TO SECURING RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY
Securing Religious Liberty has been cited in at least 15 legal
journal articles and has been the subject of five book reviews.
The following are capsule summaries of the four important
reviews:
1. Eric J. Segall, Doctrinal Legal Scholarship and Religious
Liberty: A Review of Jesse Choper's Securing Religious Liberty:t9
From a legal realist perspective, Eric Segall argues that Choper's
book, like most traditional doctrinal legal scholarship, fails to
identify and defend the underlying normative presuppositions
from which its proffered results flow. Rather, he claims Choper
surveys the legal terrain, derives a few broad principles from that
terrain, and then argues that particular results logically flow from
those principles. These principles, argues Segall, are too malleable to logically dictate Choper's suggested solutions, and Choper
fails to articulate a reasoned justification for many of his conclusions. For instance, Choper's conclusion that the state may publicly declare, "Christianity is our Religion" is either evidence that
his Intentional Advantage Principle should be modified or a fallacious inference from the principle itself. His conclusions that
the government can place religious symbols on public property,
but cannot pay a chaplain to begin legislative sessions with
prayer, cannot meaningfully be distinguished, Segall explains, because in both cases the government is using government property
and tax dollars to communicate a religious preference. He also
finds Choper's disfavor towards neutral assistance programs for
students attending religious schools difficult to reconcile with
Choper's more favorable treatment of governmental programs
that provide aid directly to religious schools. Segall states that
Choper's suggested results favor Establishment Clause values
III.

18. Choper disagrees with Supreme Court decisions invalidating such programs, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 4D2 (1985) (invalidating program in which public school teachers provided remedial instruction in parochial schools); School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating program in which public school teachers provided
remedial and enrichment classes in parochial schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) (invalidating program in which public employees provided teaching and counseling
services in parochial schools). Consequently, Choper likely would approve of the
Supreme Court's recent overruling of Aguilar and Ball in Agostini v. Felton, 1997 WL
338583 (1997).
19. 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 71 (1995).
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over free exercise values, and that Choper should have defended
this preference rather than feign objectivity under his four grand
principles.
2. John H. Garvey, Is There A Principle of Religious Liberty?:zo This is the only one of the five book reviews of Choper's
Securing Religious Liberty that applauds Choper's efforts (as a
"wonderful" book), albeit with many reservations and qualifications. John Garvey writes that Choper's general principle of religious liberty is "strangely disembodied,"z1 as evidenced by
Choper's comparison of religion and race. Garvey believes that
Choper views religion as more of a social marker-like racethan as a way of life whose value consists in living out one's
faith.z2 For instance, Garvey cites a passage in which Choper
characterizes the harm to Native Americans in Employment Division v. Smith23 as being harm to their rite of smoking peyote, a
practice that they consider religious. Their real complaint, says
Garvey, is that the law prevents them from living as they should.
Nor does Choper's "extratemporal consequences" definition of
religion comport with actual religious practice. For instance,
Garvey points out that some religions do not believe that salvation is contingent on human action. Garvey also believes that
Choper wrongly equates direct tax assessments for religion,
clearly forbidden under the Establishment Clause, with indirect
tax support for religious persons and organizations. Choper, says
Garvey, "is concerned with the religious liberty of taxpayers
rather than recipients. "24
3. Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Freedom:zs The authors analyze Choper's
book through the lens of political theory. They believe that a
determination of the norms and values underlying the First
Amendment Religion Clauses is a necessary prerequisite to developing a comprehensive theory of religious liberty, and that
Choper fails to identify the values from which his principles derive and through which they are applied. Consequently, Choper
produces results that stem from a "formalistic, idiosyncratic, and
unsatisfying" interpretation of the Religion Clauses.z6 In particular, the authors take issue with Choper's dismissal of endorse20. 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1379 (1996).
21. Garvey, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 1382 (cited in note 20).
22. Id. at 1382-83 (cited in note 20).
23. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
24. Garvey, 94 Mich. L. Rev. at 1384 (cited in note 20).
25. 74 Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1996).
26. Eisgruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 590 (cited in note 25).
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ment analysis, his analysis of Sherbert v Verner,27 and the
dominant role of money in Choper's Establishment Clause
framework. "Not since the gold standard cases has money done
so much constitutional work, and the idea that dollars should
dominate our understanding of religious justice in this way is simply implausible. "2s The authors note that Choper was uncomfortable with many of the results his principles produced, and
questioned why he would work so hard to reach results that undermined his instincts. They suggest, "Choper either did not
look for or could not find an attractive theory of religious
liberty. "29
4. Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty:3o Gary
Simson challenges three of Choper's key propositions: that free
exercise exemptions should be limited to beliefs that people are
unwilling to violate for fear of adverse extratemporal consequences; that government endorsement of religion is constitutionally inconsequential; and that public aid should be allowed
for parochial schools. Simson suggests that a better criterion
than belief in extratemporal consequences for determining sincere free exercise claims would be whether a claimant's conviction "occupies a place of real importance in that religion. "31
Next, he explains how Choper underestimates the systematic and
long-term harms of government endorsements of religion, such
as the "substantial anguish" of non-adherents' alienation, the
trivialization of the favored religion, and the distraction to government from such endorsement.32 Finally, Simson suggests that
the application of the independent impact principle to school
vouchers would flounder in the quicksand of Choper's complex
sacred-secular calculations; that Choper's "time-spent" criterion
for funding the exclusively secular aspects of parochial education
is impossible to apply, and that such public aid would violate
Choper's intentional advantage principle.
THE PRINCIPLES IN ACTION: APPLICATION TO
CURRENT RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ISSUES
Subsequent to the publication of Securing Religious Liberty,
far-reaching and controversial Religion Clause issues have arisen
that Choper either does not specifically address in his book or
IV.

27. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
28. Eisgruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 582 (cited in note 25).
29. ld. at 590 (cited in note 25).
30. 84 Cal. L. Rev. 441 (1996).
31. Simson, 84 Cal. L. Rev. at 449-50 (cited in note 30).
32. Id. at 464-68 (cited in note 30).
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addresses in cursory fashion. These issues evidence the difficulty
of applying Choper's principles:
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Responding to and
overturning the effects of Employment Division v. Smith,33 which
virtually eliminated strict scrutiny of free exercise claims brought
pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause, Congress overwhelmingly
passed (unanimously in the House; 97-3 in the Senate) the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").34 RFRA restored the requirement of strict judicial scrutiny of all
government actions that burdened religious exercise. The principal effect of RFRA was to require exemptions of religious persons and entities from generally applicable laws (otherwise valid
under Smith) that substantially burdened their religious exercise.3s However, the Supreme Court recently held RFRA to be
an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power and struck
down the law.36
33. 494 u.s. 872 (1990}.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1994).
35. See, e.g .. In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that RFRA requires
exempting from fraudulent transfer provision of bankruptcy law the $13,000 in "tithes"
contributed by debtors to their church during the year preceding their bankruptcy petition). rehearing and rehearing en bane denied, 89 F.3d 494, vacated and remanded, 1996
WL 557460 (1997) (for reconsideration, in light of City of Boerne v. Flores. see infra note
36): State v. Miller. 538 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. App. 1995) (holding that RFRA requires exempting Amish buggies from the traffic law mandating display of Slow Moving Vehicle
symbol), affd. 549 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1996); Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Kalamazoo, 532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. App. 1995) (holding that RFRA requires exempting
a Catholic school from a state's employment nondiscrimination law).
36. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 WL 345322 (1997) (6 to 3 decision with Justice
Kennedy writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas. and
Ginsburg). In Boerne, the Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress's enforcement
power under the Fourteenth Amendment by attempting to change the meaning of the
Free Exercise Clause as authoritatively interpreted in Employment Division v. Smith.
Although this holding invalidated RFRA only as applied to the States, the separation-ofpowers overtones in the majority's opinion may signal RFRA's invalidation across the
board. Indeed, the Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Boerne
the Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Young, supra note 35, which applied RFRA to federal bankruptcy law. Within a few days of the Court's decision, the President declared
that RFRA still applies to federal laws and agencies and Congress began holding hearings
and deliberating legislative responses.
Whatever Choper's views of RFRA, he likely would disapprove of the Boerne majority opinion, which smacks more of defense of territory than of reasoned adjudication. For
instance, to support its holding that RFRA lacks any "proportionality or congruence" to
the record of constitutional harms RFRA purportedly sought to remedy or prevent, the
majority asserts that RFRA's stringent "least restrictive means requirement ... was not
used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify." 1997 WL 345322 at *15.
This assertion seriously misstates the "pre-Smith jurisprudence," as RFRA's least restrictive means requirement was lifted verbatim from the Court's 8 to 1 decision in Thomas v.
Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("[t]he state may justify an inroad on religious
liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state
interest"') (emphasis added), which simply restated the free exercise test announced in

1997]

BOOK REVIEWS

407

Because Choper disagrees with the Court's decision in Smith
and believes, under the intentional advantage principle, that minority religions may (and often must) be exempted from generally applicable laws drafted by the majority, we think he
approves of RFRA.37 Yet, he refers to RFRA only twice, first
stating that "Congress has ensured temporary protection for religious liberty," (p. 58) and later that RFRA is "a particularly salient example of political solicitude for religious freedom." (p.
112) Despite these positive allusions, some implications of
RFRA may run afoul of Choper's principles. For instance,
RFRA's accommodation was not confined to claimants who believed that their religious practices entailed "extratemporal consequences,"3s as required under the burdensome effect principle.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) ("even if (the state could show a compelling interest] it would plainly be incumbent upon the {state] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights") (emphasis added) and further developed in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) ("(t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion") (emphasis added). Also defining the "preSmith jurisprudence" were the over 200 lower federal court decisions that nearly uniformly applied these restrictive means holdings before the Court issued Smith. For example, in Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1987), then-judge
Ruth Bader Ginsburg held that the Supreme Court had just "restated with unmistakable
clarity" in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141-44
(1987) that the Sherbert and Thomas compelling interest/least restrictive means test "continues to define the Supreme Court's free exercise clause jurisprudence." Yet, inexplicably, Justice Ginsburg joined the Boerne majority in stating just the opposite: that the
"least restrictive means requirement ... was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence
RFRA purported to codify."
This misstatement by the Boerne majority could further erode the free exercise test
that survived under Smith and its "exceptions." See, e.g., South Jersey Catholic School
Teachers Organization v. St. Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School, 1997
WL 411536, at *11-12 (N.J. 1997) (quoting Boerne passage criticized above for proposition that the free exercise test under Smith is a (single-prong] "compelling interest" analysis that is invoked only in "hybrid" cases involving fundamental rights in addition to free
exercise). The importance of the second prong of the free exercise test cannot be overstated, however. See, e.g., Callahan v. Woods, 736 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The
purpose of almost any law ... can be traced to a fundamental concern of government.
Balancing an individual's religious interest against such a concern will inevitably make the
former look unimportant. It is therefore the 'least restrictive means' inquiry which is the
critical aspect of the free exercise analysis.") Boerne is also being cited by states to undermine or invalidate other federal civil rights legislation formerly considered to be authorized by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), e.g., Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees of U. of lllinois, 1997 WL
409401 (7th Cir. 1997), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), e.g., Autio v.
State of Minnesota, 1997 WL 367013 (D. Minn. 1997). The authors of this review have a
work-in-progress documenting and predicting the fallout of Boerne.
37. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Flores, all seven appellate courts (four
federal and three state) that considered RFRA's constitutional validity upheld it.
38. RFRA placed a threshold requirement on claimants to show that the challenged
government action "substantially burdens" their religious exercise. A majority of courts
construed this "substantial burden" requirement favorably to claimants. See, e.g., Sasnett
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Also, some accommodations required by RFRA would have involved the government expending tax dollars to accommodate
claimants, e.g., building sweat lodges for Native American Indian
prisoners or paying unemployment benefits to the plaintiffs in
Employment Division v. Smith.39 Arguably, such expenditures
would violate the intentional advantage principle.
2. Charitable Choice. The "Charitable Choice" provision of
the welfare reform law, the "Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996," permits states to contract with and disburse federal funds to private charitable organizations, including religious organizations, to provide social
welfare services, while affirmatively prohibiting states from discriminating against religious organizations in administering their
programs.40 Advocates of Charitable Choice contend that it protects the institutional autonomy and religious expression of faithbased social service providers while protecting the religious freedom rights of individual welfare beneficiaries. Under Choper's
intentional advantage principle, arguably, Charitable Choice
would not infringe on either beneficiaries' or providers' religious
liberty because states cannot require faith-based providers to
compromise their religious character, and providers cannot require beneficiaries to participate in any per se religious programs
or activities.
Charitable Choice requires that tax funds be used only for
"secular" services such as child care, literacy education, job training, or food service-not for religious instruction, proselytization, or worship. Under Choper's independent impact principle,
tax dollars can be used to fund the secular functions of religious
organizations (at least in the parochial school context). Here,
federal funds would only be used to fund secular-not religious-welfare purposes.41
v. Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429, 1444 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (substantial burden shown if a practice "motivated by a sincerely held religious belief [was] significantly or meaningfully curtailed"), affd, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.), vacated and remanded, 1996
WL 665251 (1997) (for reconsideration in light of City of Boerne v. Flores, supra note 36).
The minority test, applied consistently only by the Ninth Circuit, required a claimant to
demonstrate that the burdened practice was (1) "mandated" by the claimant's faith, (2) a
"central" tenet of religious doctrine, and (3) "substantially" interfered with. E.g., Bryant
v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995). Even the Ninth Circuit occasionally ignores
this test. See, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 885 (9th Cir. 1995).
39. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
40. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a (1997 Supp.).
41. Choper also suggests that the independent impact principle would allow tax exemptions for religious organizations only if the exemption is "commensurate with some
secular benefit from church to state-for example, social welfare services or 'good works'
that some churches perform." (p. 172) (citation omitted).

1997]

BOOK REVIEWS

409

However, Charitable Choice could be interpreted as unconstitutional under Choper's independent impact principle. Under
this principle, tax dollars should not be used to fund the secular
objectives of religious organizations if the fulfillment of those
objectives would entail religious activity. For instance, Choper
would overturn Bowen v. Kendrick,42 in which the Court upheld
inclusion of religious organizations in a neutral, generally-applicable grant program for teenage sexuality counseling, on the basis that Congress used religion as an engine of civil policy in
funding an organization whose counseling involved religious
principles. (pp. 168, 172) Similarly, Choper could find Charitable Choice to be unconstitutional under the independent impact
principle, based on the inevitable furtherance of the recipient organizations' religious missions in the process of providing welfare
services. The application of Choper's Establishment Clause principles to Charitable Choice, then, is intriguing but confusing.
They neither dictate a clear result nor provide judges clear guidance in resolving the issue of Charitable Choice's
constitutionality.
3. Participation of religiously-affiliated schools in school
voucher programs. Choper briefly addresses vouchers at the end
of the book. (pp. 186-88) Under his independent impact principle, Choper opposes the inclusion of religious organizations in
neutral, generally-applicable public voucher programs when the
public subsidy exceeds the value of the secular service rendered.
To guard against such an excess, Choper's secular services system
would require detailed accounting of religious schools' expenditures of state funds to ensure that voucher amounts were only
used for secular purposes, and that such amounts did not exceed
the amounts spent for those same secular purposes in public
schools. (pp. 182-83)
Presumably, Choper would overturn general educational
voucher programs that include religious schools43 but fail to confine tax dollars to secular education. The fact that religion seeps
42. 487 u.s. 589 (1988).
43. Choper acknowledges (though he disagrees with its result) that Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), "effectively resolves the constitutional question in favor of vouchers." (p. 186) Accord Richard C. Reuben, Are School
Voucher Plans Constitutional?, 13 Calif. L. 35 (Oct. 1993) (dialogue between Jesse Choper
and Professor Bernard James); Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to
Parochial Schools-An Update, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 5, 12-14 (1987). But see Simmons-Harris
v. Goff, 1997 WL 217583, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App., 1997) (invalidating school choice program, under the Establishment Clause, because it "provides direct and substantial, nonneutral government aid to sectarian schools"), stay granted pending appeal (Ohio, July 24
1997).
'
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into the process of achieving the state's secular ends probably
would taint these programs in Choper's view, coercing unsuspecting taxpayers into involuntarily supporting someone else's
religious ends. As one commentator has noted, however, direct
tax assessments to benefit religion should be distinguished from
incidental benefits to religion pursuant to neutral, generally-applicable programs.44 It is questionable whether tax dollars under
these programs are actually spent for religion when the state pays
those dollars to individuals who then choose to apply them to
religious activities or institutions. As other commentators have
noted, eligible recipients of these programs have a property interest in the vouchers that government infringes by restricting the
use of those vouchers.4s Choper does not address this
argument.46
4. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia.47 In Rosenberger, a state university used student activity
fees to pay the printing costs of student publications, but refused
to pay the costs of a religious student group's publication. The
Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause permitted,
and the Free Speech Clause compelled, the university to subsidize the religious student publication on the same basis as the
other publications.
The University's program would probably fail Choper's independent impact principle. Under that principle, the secular effect of a generally-applicable program may not depend on or
derive from the initial completion of a religious aim. (p. 167)
The University would have funded the religious newspaper as a
means of achieving its secular goal of supporting student publications, which would have been accomplished only as a consequence of producing a pervasively religious, proselytizing
newspaper, thus violating the principle.
The cases Choper cites as examples of invalid programs
under the independent impact principle all involve the expendi44. See Garvey, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1385 (cited in note 20).
45. See Eisgruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 583-84 (cited in note 25).
46. Nor does Choper address the issue of whether state-facilitated financing programs for colleges are constitutional if they include religiously-affiliated schools. For examples of Supreme Court cases holding that religiously-affiliated colleges may participate
in such programs, see Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)
(upholding state noncategorical grant program that included religiously-affiliated college
among its recipients); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding state-facilitated
bond financing program that included religiously-affiliated college); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971) (upholding state capital improvement grant program that included
religiously-affiliated college).
47. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
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ture of tax money.4s In contrast, Rosenberger could be read as
permitting the state to apply private funds, rather than tax dollars, to religious student organizations, since the funds in Rosenberger were comprised of required student activity fees.
Characterized in this light, the program could satisfy the independent impact principle.49 Because the funds were extracted,
controlled, and applied by the state, however, they bore a striking resemblance to tax dollars. Once again, it is not clear how
Choper's principles should be applied to this case, though
Choper has criticized its holding.so
V.

APPLYING THE RELIGION CLAUSES THROUGH A
GLASS DARKLY

1. Presuppositional truisms. Choper's analysis is deductive.
He begins with four grand principles (none of which receives
much inductive support), then applies these principles in determining whether Supreme Court religion cases were decided
rightly or wrongly. Choper struggles to be fair and balanced in
fashioning his principles. To avoid subjectivity and "personal
predilections," his analysis is process-oriented rather than resultoriented. He follows his principles to the conclusions he feels
they logically lead to, then takes great pains to let the reader
know that he does not agree with all the results he manipulates
his principles to achieve.
Inevitably, Choper's application of his principles is more
normative than descriptive, as such application involves moral,
political, and policy judgments based on normative presuppositions.si In determining and applying his principles, Choper
makes a number of value judgments based on presuppositions
that he doesn't clearly identify or sufficiently support. To
Choper's credit, he recognizes that many of his judgments will
reflect his personal values, and he promises to "self-consciously
48. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
49. The intentional advantage principle does not apply here, since the program was
generally applicable and not designed to support religion. By way of analogy, however,
Choper believes that a state may require copies of the Ten Commandments to be posted
in public school classrooms, if the copies are paid for by private funds (p. 147) (citing
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)). Even though the state's intent in requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments would be to favor religion, no tax money would be
used and no one's religious beliefs would be coerced or influenced in a significant way.
50. See Jesse H. Choper, Dangers to Religious Liberty From Neutral Government
Programs, 29 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 719 (1996) (criticizing and minimizing the "neutrality"
holding of Rosenberger).
51. See Segall, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. at 72-73 (cited in note 19).
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identify those points along the way where predilection rather
than logic provides a significant link in the discussion." (p. 11)
However, he fails to address many of these predilections. For
example, Choper's book reveals a relativistic perspective that the
First Amendment should be interpreted in accordance with contemporary values and traditions, in addition to the history and
text of the amendment. (pp. 1, 6, 122, 171, 177) Because the
framers could not have foreseen such developments as public education, antidiscrimination law, and unemployment insurance,
(p. 5) Choper believes that we must interpret church/state
problems arising in these and other contemporary contexts in accordance with contemporary values. However, Choper does not
define "contemporary values." He does not provide guidance for
how they should be determined, nor does he discuss how the correct contemporary values should be chosen from among competing sets of values in applying the Religion Clauses.
Implicit in Choper's work is a naturalistic, reductionist view
that only that which is scientifically "verifiable" in the physical
world belongs to the "rational," whereas that which is not verifiable, or is taken on faith, is not debatable. (pp. 82-83) Because
religion is a matter of subjective "belief," Choper does not believe that we can discuss it rationally or argue its substantive merits.sz Nowhere in his book does Choper acknowledge that
52. See generally Francis Schaeffer, Escape From Reason (InterVarsity Press, 1968)
(describing how modern philosophy considers religion to be in the nonrational, unverifiable realm of "freedom" rather than in the rational realm of "nature"); accord Phillip E.
Johnson, Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Law & Education (InterVarsity Press, 1995). Ironically, the latter book, authored by Choper's longtime
Berkeley colleague, was published the same year as Choper's Securing Religious Liberty.
Johnson, like Choper, clerked for Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s before joining
the Berkeley law faculty and, like Choper, has lectured and published widely on "law and
religion." Although their credentials are similar, Johnson's predilections on the topic are
quite different:
The most influential intellectuals in America and around the world are mostly
naturalists, who assume that God exists only as an idea in the minds of religious
believers. In our greatest universities, naturalism-the doctrine that nature is
'all there is'-is the virtually unquestioned assumption that underlies not only
natural science but intellectual work of all kinds .... It is said that naturalism is
science, whereas theism belongs to religion; naturalism is based on reason,
whereas theism is based on faith; and naturalism provides knowledge, whereas
theism provides only belief. Science, reason and knowledge easily trump religion, faith and belief.
Id. at 7-8, 10. Using a form of the "ultimate concerns" definition of religion, Johnson
explains that "metaphysical naturalism" is the "established religious philosophy" in
America, id. at 35-50, a "story that is promulgated aggressively in the educational world
and the media with the resources of government." Id. at 15. Johnson says there is nothing "sinister" or even "inherently unconstitutional" about the de facto existence of such a
public religious philosophy, and that it "is established not in the sense that it is formally
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religion could be a rationally defined and chosen value in his hierarchy of "contemporary values."
Choper holds a dualistic view that secular effects of government programs can and must be completely independent of religious expression or activity, and that religious content dilutes the
"full secular value" of an activity or service. (pp. 164-67, 177)
Choper assumes that courts, in determining whether secular effects are independent of religious activity, can make clear distinctions between the secular and the sacred, even within a religious
environment such as a sectarian school. (pp. 179-83) This view
overlooks the complex nature of presuppositions underlying all
beliefs, whether religious or secular. It places the judiciary in the
position of having to evaluate the substantive content of belief,
ensuring that the religious quantum of such content is appropriately de minimus to qualify for funding. Choper does not explain
how judges should make such fine distinctions between the secular and religious, or strike a proper balance between the two.
Nor do his four principles provide such guidance. Under
Choper's hierarchy of the Religion Clauses, in which the Establishment Clause trumps the Free Exercise Clause when the two
are in conflict, (pp. 24, 54, 97, 160) the secular would inevitably
triumph over the sacred.
2. Recipe for confusion. Although the results of Choper's
analysis are creative, some of them undermine the validity of his
principles. For instance, Choper believes that Witters v. Washington Dep 't of Services for the Blinds3 should be overturned and
that the state should refuse to allow recipients of aid under generally-applicable funding programs (e.g., scholarships for the
visually impaired at issue in Witters) to apply that aid to religious
organizations or activities. (p. 169) Such a refusal, however,
risks violating Choper's deliberate disadvantage principle. Because religious schools would be required to distinguish the "religious" elements of their educational programs from the "secular
elements" of those programs, the schools would have an incentive to secularize in order to qualify for state aid. Furthermore, if
enacted ... but in the sense that it provides a philosophical basis for lawmaking and
public education." ld. at 35-36.
Choper's expansive definition of religion for Establishment Clause purposes includes
beliefs in "ultimate truth" and general "ideologies." (pp. 104-05, 116-17) Naturalism, as
defined by Schaeffer and Johnson, fits into this definition. Thus, if government funding
and support is directed at persons or institutions that espouse a naturalistic ideology, it
would raise serious Establishment Clause concerns in the area that troubles Choper the
most-public funding and support of religious beliefs and activity. This problem escapes
Choper's attention, evidently because of his own naturalistic presuppositions.
53. 474 u.s. 481 (1986).
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states were to refuse to allow religious schools to participate in
voucher programs, such exclusion arguably would constitute a
"deliberate disadvantage" to both religious schools and voucher
recipients. This exclusion would discriminate against individuals
because of the religious content of their beliefs, and would discriminate against schools on the basis of the religious content of
their curricula, thereby violating Choper's first free exercise
principle.s4
Another example is the inconsistency in Choper's application of Establishment Clause principles to Sherbert v. Vernerss
and Employment Division v. Smith.56 He believes that Sherbert
was wrongly decided because the Court-ordered unemployment
benefits amounted to "religious coercion in the form of a tax subsidy for religious practice." (p. 121) Although the plaintiffs in
Smith also sought unemployment benefits, Choper believes they
should have won their case. Rather than address the unemployment compensation issue in Smith, however, Choper merely recites part of the Court's holding-that Oregon did not have to
grant a free exercise exemption from its law prohibiting possession of peyote. (p. 55, 57-58) Never does he affirm, let alone
mention, the Court's holding that Oregon may deny unemployment benefits premised on a claimant's violation of a generallyapplicable law. This omission is selective, since Choper urges at
once that Smith be reversed and that free exercise exemptions
allowing receipt of government funds violate the Establishment
Clause. Choper never addresses this inconsistency.
In attempting to make fine, nuanced distinctions, Choper
often makes arbitrary ones. For instance, Choper applies his intentional advantage principle to conclude that the government
may make Good Friday a paid state holiday, but only if the state
does not intend to observe Good Friday as a religious holiday.s?
(pp. 155-56) Yet, the same state may declare, "Christianity is our
religion" as long as it does not spend significant tax funds in the
54. Arguably, money given to individuals pursuant to neutral programs such as that
in Witters does not actually belong to the government-or to the taxpayers-but rather to
individuals who have met the criteria of such programs and are therefore entitled to the
money. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits are a
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them, and that such persons are entitled to procedural due process before benefits may be terminated); see Eisgruber and Sager, 74 Tex. L. Rev. at 583-84 (cited in note 25).
55. 374 u.s. 398 (1963).
56. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
57. Choper's expansive definition of religion under the intentional advantage principle includes ultimate concerns and "nonreligious ideologies." (pp. 104-05, 116-17) Yet,
Choper does not necessarily consider Good Friday to be a religious holiday for purposes
of applying the principle.
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process. (pp. 157-58) Although Choper's questionable application of his principles produces such incoherent results, he never
questions these results; he simply bears them, sometimes in grim
resignation.ss
3. Separation anxiety. The purpose of Choper's project is to
develop a comprehensive thesis for adjudication of all significant
issues that arise under the Religion Clauses (p. 1) and, ultimately, to protect religious liberty in America. (p. 9) In his efforts to preserve the separation of church from state money
under the Establishment Clause, however, Choper loses sight of
an essential part of the religious liberty equation: facilitating the
free exercise of religion. Instead, what emerges from Choper's
presuppositions, principles, and applications is the message that
religion is more of a dangerous, irrational force than a positive
good and that religion should be neutralized by government and
the courts, lest it coerce taxpayers to support religion or suffer
unwilling cognitive dissonance or conversion.
Choper's analysis does not reflect the nature of religious exercise in our society or the cultural context in which the Religion
Clauses operate (i.e., the increasingly a-religious nature of our
society and the sensitivity with which government officials and
agencies shield themselves from religious activity and influences9). As a result, Choper is overly sensitive to such issues as
tax funds ultimately making their way into religious organizations' coffers and the effect that the Pledge of Allegiance, released time, or graduation prayer will have on the conscience of
public school children.
Nor does Choper recognize the possibility, under the Religion Clauses, of non-coercive cooperation between government
and faith-based organizations in addressing causes and seeking
solutions to societal problems such as poverty, crime, and addiction. He is more concerned with constructive separation than a
constructive partnership, and apparently believes the latter is an
oxymoron.

58. In his "Afterword" section, (pp. 189-90) Choper indicates his dissatisfaction
with many of his results, such as permitting public schools to excise the study of evolution
from the curriculum, allowing local governments to erect sectarian displays on public
property, permitting government to declare that "Christianity is our religion," and
prohibiting the accommodations at issue in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and
Wa/z v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
59. See Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief (Basic Books, 1993) (arguing
that religion and religious influence have been excised from public life and should be
restored).
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CONCLUSION

Choper's failure to justify his normative presuppositions and
apply his corresponding Religion Clause principles consistently is
not unique to him; the same problems plague the Supreme
Court's largely arbitrary and inconsistent jurisprudence in this
area. As difficult as it is to interpret and apply the Religion
Clauses, Choper demonstrates that it is even more difficult to ascertain abstract fundamental principles underlying those clauses
and apply them consistently and sensibly. Choper criticizes the
Supreme Court's approach to state aid to schools as
"'sacrific[ing] clarity and predictability for flexibility,"'60 (p. 176)
but he substitutes one flexible, confusing framework for another.
In applying Choper's principles, judges inevitably would give effect to their individual predilections, further confusing and mystifying Religion Clause jurisprudence.
In the end, Choper's work is a provocative but unpersuasive
attempt to bring clarity and consistency to the muddled arena of
Religion Clause jurisprudence. He understands the problems involved in such an undertaking, but cannot avoid them. His project overreaches and thus collapses under the weight of its
laudable idealism. Choper does not provide much hope for a
uniform interpretation of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. Instead, he only adds his distinctive, confusing spin to a
rather arbitrary and ambiguous jurisprudence.

EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS. By David Kyvig.t
Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 1996. Pp.
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John Vifez

Of all the innovations of the U.S. Constitution, the process
of providing for formal constitutional change through an amending process may be one of the most underappreciated. When
properly functioning, such a mechanism renders violent revolution unnecessary by allowing for legal changes without the resort
to violence. A well-constructed amending mechanism also helps
60. Citing Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
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